A Systemic Crisis of Legitimacy:
A Comprehensive Analysis of Public Sentiment in Russia and Expert Opinions.
A summary of expert assessments and sociological data
as of April 20, 2026.
Sources: VTsIOM, FOM, expert materials from Telegram channels and public speeches.
Study period: November 2025 – April 2026
Summary
The expert community unanimously notes that by the spring of 2026, the Russian government will have exhausted all its key resources of legitimacy. As military analyst Yuri Baranchik, methodologist Sergei Pereslegin, and economist Robert Nigmatulin emphasize, the country is entering a period of systemic crisis, comparable in its potential for instability to the eve of 1917 or 1991. Sociological surveys by VTsIOM and FOM fully confirm these alarming assessments:
• Spontaneous rating of V. Putin (without prompting): a precipitous drop from 48.8% to 29.5% (-19.3 percentage points, -39.5%), followed by a correction to 42.3% in April.
• Rating of United Russia: decline to a historic low of 27.3% (VTsIOM) – 37% (FOM).
• Economic policy: for the first time, disapproval exceeded approval (37% vs. 27%, index – 21).
• Foreign policy: the compensatory mechanism collapsed – the approval index fell by 18 points in 4 months.
As experts from the channel “Trends of the Era” accurately put it, “the social contract of the 2000s, based on the exchange of freedoms for stability, has been completely destroyed: there is no stability, freedoms have been taken away, and the government offers only survival in conditions of permanent crisis.”
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PART 1. FOREIGN POLICY: SLIPPERING OF THE COMPENSATORY MECHANISM OF THE “BESIEGED FORTRESS” AND STRATEGIC PROBLEMS IN ITS
1.1. Expert Context: From a “Besieged Fortress” to a Slow-Move Scenario.
For decades, the foreign policy framework has served as the main compensator for domestic problems. However, as military analyst Yuriy Baranchyk points out, the SVO has entered a slow-moving scenario: tactical successes are not translating into a strategic turning point. Military correspondent Kotenok emphasizes that 80–90% of personnel losses occur during the advance to the front line due to the total dominance of drones, and the pace of advance is measured in hundreds of meters per day. According to experts, the Pentagon predicts that, if the current pace continues, reaching Ukraine’s western borders will take 100 years.
At the same time, the enemy is implementing a “strategy of horizontal escalation” (a term former MI6 chief Alex Younger used in reference to Iran). The multi-day strikes by cardboard drones on the port of Ust-Luga, flying through the airspace of Finland and the Baltic states, which have officially acknowledged this, are assessed by experts (like military blogger Baranchik) as NATO complicity in an armed attack. The lack of a strong, symmetrical response from Moscow creates the feeling among patriotic audiences that the government has “lost the will to win.”
Added to this is the institutional weakness of BRICS and the SCO, which have failed to develop a unified position even on Iran, and China’s role as an economic beneficiary, not a military ally.
Russia finds itself in foreign policy zugzwang: any escalation threatens a direct confrontation with NATO, while abandoning it leads to a loss of initiative and authority.
1.2. Sociological confirmation: a collapse in foreign policy indices and a record rise in discontent.
Quantitative surveys by VTsIOM fully confirm the expert diagnosis of the collapse of the compensatory mechanism.
Table 1. Change in the Foreign Policy Approval Index
Period Approval Index Change
November 2025 59 –
March 2026 41 –18 points (–30.5%)
This is the most dramatic drop among all four spheres of public policy.
Table 2. Growth of Foreign Policy Disapproval (November 2025 – March 2026)
Indicator November 2025 March 2026 Change Growth Rate
Share of those disapproving 16% 25% +9 p.p. +56.3%
The more than one and a half times increase in disapproval over 4 months is a direct statistical reflection of disappointment in the results of the Foreign Policy Review, fatigue from confrontation, and a feeling of vulnerability in the rear, as discussed by experts. Although the formal balance of assessments remains positive (48% approve vs. 25% disapprove), the rate of decline in the index and the rate of growth of dissatisfaction signal that, for the first time in 12 years, foreign policy has ceased to be a source of legitimacy and has become a source of anxiety.
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PART 2. ECONOMY: THE ACHILLES’ HEEL OF THE RUSSIAN PARTY AND THE TRANSITION TO THE NEGATIVE ZONE
2.1. Expert Context: From “Military Keynesianism” to a Protracted Recession.
Experts assess economic policy as the most vulnerable link. At the Moscow Economic Forum, RAS Academician Robert Nigmatulin publicly declared the “current course of action at a dead end,” citing record-low per capita incomes, depopulation, and the failure to implement the “May decrees.” Vladimir Boglaev, Director of the Cherepovets Foundry and Mechanical Plant, warned of a “complete loss of feedback from the top brass” and the looming prospect of serious upheavals.
Analyst Kirill Rodionov notes an explosive increase in public debt servicing costs (up to 3.1 trillion rubles per year), which has become the main cause of the growing budget deficit. Many experts are declaring the exhaustion of the “military Keynesian” model. The tax reform, intended to replenish the budget, has backfired: according to Opora Rossii, 5.5% of SMEs (approximately 350,000 enterprises) closed in the first quarter of 2026. Raising the corporate tax to 25% failed to deliver the expected revenue growth (actual growth was 72% instead of the planned 92%), amid falling corporate profits. All this is happening against a backdrop of record-breaking inaccessibility of higher education in a decade (tuition at top universities is dozens of times higher than European equivalents) and inflationary pressure on the basic consumer basket.
2.2. Sociological Confirmation: Historic Low Approval and Negative Balance.
VTsIOM data confirms that economic policy has become a net negative for the government.
Table 3. Economic Policy Approval Index (November 2025 – March 2026)
Sphere November 2025 March 2026 Change Rate of Decline
Economy 32 21 –9 points –28.1%
Index 21 is the absolute minimum among all spheres of public administration.
Table 4. Balance of Approval and Disapproval of Economic Policy (March 2026)
Indicator Value
Approval 27% (historical minimum)
Disapproval 37%
Balance –10 p.p.
Critical moment: in February 2026, the curves intersected, and the share of dissatisfied people exceeded the share of approving people for the first time. A symmetrical change over 4 months (approval –5 p.p., disapproval +5 p.p.) means that citizens are not simply retreating into uncertainty, but are consciously moving into the dissatisfied camp. This fully correlates with expert assessments that the population directly links the deterioration of their financial situation with the failures of the government’s economic strategy.
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PART 3. DOMESTIC POLICY: BUREAUCRATIC “STUPIDITY,” THE MIGRATION ISSUE, AND ELITE “DEBUNKING THE SITUATION”
3.1. Expert context: digital neurosis, migration, and preparation for transit
Domestic politics, according to experts, is teetering on the brink of entering a negative zone due to the accumulation of domestic frustration and intra-elite conflicts.
Digital neurosis. Roskomnadzor and the Ministry of Digital Development, Communications and Mass Media’s attempts to block VPNs and slow down Telegram have led, as analysts put it, to “bureaucratic obtuseness.” Psychiatrist Anton Shestakov explains that the shutdown of familiar services triggers an acute stress response at the neurobiological level, and psychologists are recording a one-third increase in anxious inquiries. As the “Lampovyi Preemnik” (Lamp Tube Successor) channel notes, the state’s intrusion into the digital environment has politicized previously apolitical groups, fueling the “Boniy incident.” According to Yuri Baranchik, Bonniy’s statement was not spontaneous, but a “commissioned order” from those who could not reach the president through official channels, and is a symptom of a profound dysfunction in the vertical communication chain.
The migration issue. Deputy Mikhail Matveyev points to the persistent threat of replacement migration and public demand for the prioritization of the rights of indigenous peoples. The use of cheap migrant labor to hold down wages and eschew modernization is causing growing irritation.
Intra-elite tensions are building. Military analyst Vladimir Prokhvatilov documents the activities of an “operational center” that coordinates critical disinformation (from lawyer Remeslo to beauty blogger V. Boni and deputy Wasserman) in the style of “the good tsar, the bad boyars.” Sergei Pereslegin directly draws parallels with February 1917, warning of the risk of security agencies and bureaucracy withdrawing from the game. Maxim Klimov adds criticism of the failures of the high military command (lack of tactical communication, enemy dominance in UAVs), which reinforces the general feeling of incompetence.
3.2. Sociological confirmation: a critically narrow margin of safety and growing disapproval.
VTsIOM data confirms that domestic policy is on the verge of losing legitimacy.
Table 5. Domestic Policy Approval Index (November 2025 – March 2026)
Sphere November 2025 March 2026 Change Rate of Decline
Domestic Policy 45 33 –12 points –26.7%
Table 6. Domestic Policy Approval Balance (March 2026)
Indicator Value
Approval 35%
Disapproval 31%
Balance +4 p.p. (critically narrow margin)
Table 7. Growth of Domestic Policy Disapproval
Period Disapproval Change Growth Rate
November 2025 23% – –
March 2026 31% +8 p.p. +34.8%
A gap of only 4 percentage points means that if the current rate of growth of discontent continues, domestic policy will go into negative territory in the coming months. This is a direct statistical reflection of the effects of digital neurosis, migration tensions, and the general feeling of incompetence in the management system that experts are talking about.
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PART 4. SOCIAL SPHERE: ANXIETY AS A BACKGROUND AND LOSS OF SUPPORT
4.1. Expert Context: From “Calm Anxiety” to Politicization of Discontent
The social sphere formally maintains a positive balance, but experts are documenting a profound erosion of the sense of security. Psychologists and psychiatrists are noting an increase in complaints related to the “loss of support.” Blocks of internet services are compounded by chronic anxiety about rising food and utility prices.
The “Boni Case” has become a trigger, politicizing a female lifestyle audience traditionally far removed from politics. Yuri Baranchik emphasizes that her speech hit a nerve with a huge audience whose personal comfort was violated by the state. This is a signal that the resource of patience and loyalty, based on fear of the chaos of the 1990s, is close to exhaustion. Structural problems (shortage of personnel in medicine, deterioration of infrastructure, growing social inequality) worsen the picture.
4.2. Sociological confirmation: minimal margin of safety
VTsIOM data confirm that the social sphere, although holding on to a positive position, has the smallest margin of safety after the economy and domestic policy.
Table 8. Social Policy Approval Index (November 2025 – March 2026)
Sphere November 2025 March 2026 Change Rate of decline
Social sphere 40 34 –6 points –15.0%
Table 9. Social Policy Approval Balance (March 2026)
Indicator Value
Approval 36%
Disapproval 30%
Balance +6 p.p. (narrow margin)
A margin of 6 points means that the social sphere is extremely vulnerable to further deterioration of the economic situation. An increase in disapproval by +2 p.p. (from 28% to 30%) may seem insignificant, but combined with general anxiety and expert assessments of a “loss of support,” this indicates a high potential for a sharp decline in the event of a new round of inflation or unpopular reforms.
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PART 5. PRESIDENTIAL RATINGS: EROSION OF THE “HARD CORE” AND SYMPTOMS OF TRANSIT
5.1. Expert context: from “crush the vermin” to the question “where is the reaction?”
Experts note a fundamental change in the perception of the president. Experts emphasize that V. Putin’s legitimacy has historically been based on the image of a tough leader capable of “crushing the vermin” and providing an asymmetrical response. However, the lack of a tough response to the attacks on Ust-Luga through NATO territory, the inertial nature of the SVO, and the onset of digital neurosis among the population are creating cognitive dissonance among the loyalist core. Experts Vladimir Prokhvatilov and Sergei Pereslegin agree that the system is seeking survival through a different power structure, and the president, perceived as toxic by the West, is becoming an obstacle to elite adaptation.
5.2. Sociological confirmation: a collapse of the spontaneous rating and a decrease in unconditional trust
The data from VTsIOM and FOM provide a statistical basis for these arguments.
Table 10. Spontaneous rating of V. Putin (without prompting)
Period Spontaneous rating Change
March 2024 48.8% –
April 2025 (peak) 54.0% –
March 2026 (minimum) 29.5% –24.5 p.p. from the peak
A drop from the peak of 45.4% (to 29.5%) is an unprecedented volatility, reflecting the extreme instability of public sentiment and the influence of resonant events (such as the “Boney incident”).
Table 11. Structure of trust in V. Putin (year-on-year)
Indicator April 2025 April 2026 Change
I unconditionally trust 45.1% 37.5% –7.6 p.p. (-16.9%)
Rather trust 33.6% 34.5% +0.9 pp
Rather distrust 8.7% 11.7% +3.0 pp
Definitely distrust 8.8% 11.7% +2.9 pp
The 7.6 pp reduction in the “hard core” of unconditional supporters, coupled with a 2.9 pp increase in unconditional distrust, is direct statistical confirmation of the erosion of core loyalty that experts have warned about. The growing gap between prompted approval (76%) and spontaneous approval (42.3%) (from 26 to 33.7 pp over the year) suggests that support is becoming increasingly inertial and ritualistic rather than genuine.
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PART 6. PARTY RATINGS AND ELECTORAL RISKS OF THE 2026 EDG: ABSENTEEISM AS THE MAIN BENEFICIARY
6.1. Expert context: “Indistinct” voices and the risks of transition
Experts point out that the government crisis is not converting into an increase in the popularity of the systemic opposition. Yuri Baranchik, commenting on the polls, is surprised by the level of radicalization of the population, but notes that neither the CPRF nor the LDPR are becoming centers of gravity for protest. This means the possibility of the emergence of a “third force.”
Vladimir Prokhvatilov, using the “Bremmer J-curve” model, predicts a slide into chaos in an attempt to maintain the closed system. According to analysts, the main risk for the government at the 2026 EDG is not an opposition victory, but low turnout and absenteeism, which delegitimize any results.
6.2. Sociological confirmation: United Russia’s decline and conflicting data on beneficiaries
The data from VTsIOM and FOM differ in details, but agree on the main point: United Russia is losing support at a record pace.
Table 12. United Russia rating (average VTsIOM+FOM)
Period Rating
April 2025 ~44.0%
February 2026 ~35.9%
April 2026 ~32.2%
Change over the year -11.8 percentage points
The rate of decline is accelerating: from -0.64 percentage points/month at the beginning of the year to -1.85 percentage points/month by the spring.
Table 13. Electorate redistribution structure (two versions)
Recipient VTsIOM version (increase) FOM version (increase)
New People +7.4 percentage points (44% of United Russia’s losses) -3 percentage points
CPRF +2.6 percentage points 0 pp
LDPR +2.1 pp +2 pp
Absenteeism/undecided +0.7 pp +7 pp (64% losses)
Regardless of which version is closer to the truth, both pictures are catastrophic for the authorities:
• According to VTsIOM: protest is converted into support for new players, which creates competition in the systemic field.
• According to FOM: protest is converted into absenteeism and apathy, which completely deprives the elections of legitimacy and creates the risk of an explosion of accumulated discontent without institutional channels of expression.
Conclusion on the elections: United Russia is approaching the 2026 United Voting Day with its worst starting position in 20 years. Even taking into account the administrative resource (+9-10 pp historically), the predicted result is in the range of 37-47%. Expert consensus (Prokhvatilov, Pereslegin, Baranchik) indicates that August-September 2026 is the point of maximum vulnerability for political transition or serious upheavals.
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CONCLUSION: SYSTEMIC CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY – EMPIRICAL CONFIRMATION OF EXPERT FORECASTS
The integration of qualitative expert assessments and quantitative sociological data allows us to draw a clear conclusion: the Russian Federation is experiencing a systemic crisis of government legitimacy, unprecedented since the early 2000s.
1. Foreign policy, the main source of legitimacy since 2014, has not fully supported the ruling party’s domestic policies. The 18-point drop in the index and the 56.3% increase in disapproval over four months are statistical evidence of a weakening of the compensatory mechanism that military analysts warned about.
2. Economic policy has become a “net minus.” The intersection of the approval and disapproval curves (27% vs. 37%) and the index of 21 are the digital embodiment of the forecasts of Academician Nigmatulin, Director Boglaev, and data on the mass closure of small and medium-sized businesses according to Opora Rossii.
3. Domestic policy is on the verge of negative territory (balance +4 percentage points). The 34.8% increase in disapproval confirms the effects of “digital neurosis,” migration tensions, and intra-elite instability, as documented by experts.
4. The president’s spontaneous approval rating and the erosion of the “hard core” of unconditional trust (-7.6 percentage points) are a direct statistical reflection of the arguments about the exhaustion of the “crush the vermin” model and the elites’ search for transit routes.
5. The electoral field is currently demonstrating not opposition mobilization, but depoliticization and absenteeism. The average rating of United Russia (FOM/VTsIOM) is at a historic low (32%), and the main beneficiary, according to FOM, is abstention from participating in the elections. According to VTsIOM, the beneficiaries of United Russia’s falling ratings are New People and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. This is creating a “perfect storm” for the 2026 United Russia Election Day, which, according to analysts, could trigger uncontrollable destabilization.
Key insight: VTsIOM and FOM polls are no longer a tool for demonstrating stability. They have become a mirror reflecting the depth of the governance crisis and confirming the most alarming predictions of the expert community. The summer-fall 2026 political season promises to be the riskiest in the past 26 years.
Prepared by:
S.P.Obukhov, A.M. Mikhalchuk, I.M. Kupriyanova, A.M. Bogachev, N.V.Fokina
Responsible for the release: S.P. Obukhov, Doctor of Political Science
Center for Research of Political Culture of Russia – Communist Party of the Russian Federation