A profound paradox has emerged in modern Russia: the historical recognition of the Russian people as the state-forming nation at the highest legislative level, following amendments to the Constitution in 2020, is accompanied by growing systemic threats to its demographic, socioeconomic, and cultural reproduction.
The report of the Center for Political Analysis and Criticism of the Russian Federation, “On the Situation of the State-Forming Russian People in the Russian Federation. 2026,” represents the first attempt at a comprehensive audit of the status and position of the Russian majority in the Russian Federation.
Not only are the remaining gaps in defining the legal foundations of the state-forming status of the Russian people obvious, but also the need for their swift legislative and regulatory resolution. Furthermore, a chain of interrelated crises—from the spatial contraction of Russian settlement even in the historical core regions to the food and infrastructural degradation of historical Russian territories—remains relevant not so much for the development as for the survival of the state-forming people. A self-perpetuating cycle of decline is emerging, and to break and overcome it, a scientifically sound program for decisive changes in the state’s socioeconomic and political policies is needed.
Legal vacuum: from declarations to real status
The enshrinement of the concept of “state-forming people” in the Russian Constitution in 2020 was the result of nearly thirty years of political struggle, with the Communist Party of the Russian Federation consistently serving as the vanguard. However, today this status is primarily declarative, reduced to a narrow linguistic function. Moreover, even the 1991 law “On the Languages of the Peoples of the Russian Federation” has yet to incorporate the new constitutional category.
The concept of “state-forming people” is paradoxically absent from the fundamental documents regulating migration policy and the protection of traditional values (Decrees No. 809, No. 622, No. 738). Even in the area of migration, a narrow “linguistic” approach has been implemented instead of a broad ethnopolitical interpretation.
At the same time, the State Nationalities Policy Strategy through 2036, adopted in 2025, explicitly states for the first time that the Russian people are “a state-forming people whose language, culture, and traditions require protection and promotion.” Furthermore, a specific measurable indicator is even introduced: the share of activities promoting Russian culture must be at least 50%. This shift, albeit very limited, from a passive characterization to an active instrument can only be welcomed. However, the obvious fragmented implementation of the constitutional provision on the state-forming status of the Russian people leaves a systemic tension between the proclaimed state-forming status and the actual mechanisms for ensuring it.
Demographic crisis and the erosion of the historical “core”
Behind the façade of external statistical stability (the number of Russians remaining at around 119 million people) lies a profound demographic transformation.
The post-Soviet period (1991–2025) is comparable in scale to the tragedies of the 20th century in terms of Russian losses, but it has a fundamentally different, non-military nature.
Socioeconomic collapse, a collapse of the birth rate across the Russian Federation as a whole from the late Soviet level of 2.01 to 1.16 children per woman in 1999, followed by only a slight recovery to the current 1.40 (1.23 in the core of Russian regions), excess mortality, and three waves of emigration. Add to this structural shifts—aging (the share of the population aged 65+ increased from 8% to 22%), gender imbalance, and a formal decline in the share of ethnic Russians in the census from 81% to 71% (due to the huge proportion of those who did not indicate their ethnic identity). All these and other factors could make the consequences of the crisis irreversible unless there is a shift in the entire development paradigm.
The territorial foundation of Russian demography remains the 44 “core” regions, with an ethnic Russian population share exceeding 90% and home to 73.44% of all ethnic Russians in the country. It is here that critical differentiation unfolds. On the one hand, agglomeration concentration draws almost a third of the “core” ethnic Russian population into six major regions (Moscow, the Moscow Region, Krasnodar Krai, St. Petersburg, and the Rostov and Sverdlovsk Regions). On the other hand, the vast Non-Black Earth Zone and even the Black Earth Zone (Pskov, Smolensk, Tver, Ivanovo, Kostroma, Oryol, Tambov, and other regions) has become a zone of chronic depopulation, with a total fertility rate (TFR) below 1.2.
Moreover, the estimated TFR for the Russian “core” regions in 2024 (1.28) is 8.8% lower than the national average. And the Leningrad Region recorded a uniquely low figure for the Russian Federation—0.888, which is 36.6% lower than the national average. True, the federal average is higher due to the presence of ethnic republics with high birth rates and multi-ethnic regions with a Russian majority. But this slightly higher TFR likely merely masks the real demographic gap in the Russian-speaking regions.
At the same time, the Russian Far East and North are experiencing a physical loss of population. Magadan, Kamchatka, Karelia, Transbaikalia, and the Jewish Autonomous Oblast, all part of the Russian “core,” are losing their Russian presence despite their nominally high share.
For the first time in modern history, a migratory erosion of the monolithic Russian space from within is being recorded: foreign-cultural enclaves are forming in the Kaluga, Oryol, and Moscow regions, while the assimilation resource in the Volga region and Siberia does not compensate for the overall vector of contraction.
The Migration Challenge: From Repatriation to the Threat of Population Replacement
The external demographic reserve has been exhausted: the Russian diaspora in neighboring countries has shrunk from 25 million to 7.5 million. The era of compatriots returning is over, and the migration flow has already assumed the character of a replacement of other ethnic groups.
Historically close ethnic groups to Russians (Belarusians, Germans, Mordvins) have dropped out of the top ten largest peoples of Russia, and their place has been taken by people from Central Asia and Transcaucasia.
This process incurs colossal socioeconomic costs. Cheap migrant labor depresses wages for Russian workers and workers of other indigenous nationalities (the share of labor in Russia’s GDP is only 40-45% compared to 55-65% in developed countries), perpetuates technological backwardness, and places a heavy burden on social infrastructure.
Moreover, according to RANEPA, 37 ethnic enclaves have formed in the country, where 64% of residents associate only with their own people. However, 37% of migrants (residents of the enclaves) already hold Russian passports.
Uncontrolled migration has resulted in growing fears and frustration among the constituent peoples of Russia and other indigenous peoples. More than 76% of Russians perceive migrants as a threat.
Under pressure from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and society, the “party in power” was forced to agree to the development and adoption of 22 federal laws to streamline migration policy. The total number of permanently residing foreigners decreased by 700,000 over the year (from 6.8 to 6.1 million), although overall, 12-13 million migrants move through the Russian Federation annually, with varying lengths of stay.
The Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) faction continues to insist on a transition to strict demographic protectionism: “targeted recruitment” as the only mechanism (“arrive—work—leave”), a ban on family entry, expanded penalties for serious crimes, withdrawal from the IOM, and the denunciation of the Global Compact for Migration.
The UN’s long-term forecast (a loss of 46.6 million indigenous Russians under 70 by 2075 under a “zero migration” scenario) makes even the measures already taken clearly insufficient. The problem has shifted from a political choice to a survival imperative.
Signs of alienation of Russians from power and property
The economic situation of the nation-forming nation remains hostage to the results of the privatization of the 1990s. National wealth remains concentrated in the hands of a small group of beneficiaries.
Beyond inequality, researchers also highlight ongoing ethnic imbalances. This issue has been explored in publications by Lenta.ru (2014), analytical portals such as EconBez.ru (2012), independent bloggers (2013), and academic works by S. V. Mareeva and E. D. Slobodenyuk (2024). For example, if we take the consolidated register of Forbes rating participants, by 2025, the share of Russians on the Forbes list (the segment of large property owners only), estimated by Lenta.ru, was only 50%, while the share of Russian billionaires’ total wealth was 46.4%. Clearly, this level does not correspond to a demographic weight of 80%.
Clearly, the discrepancy between the ethnic composition of the “oligarchy” and the country’s population serves here only as a clear illustration of the anti-national nature of the criminal privatization of the 1990s, and nothing more. After all, the nature of oligarchic comprador capital is such that even if it were 100% ethnically Russian, corporate interests would still completely pit them against the interests of the majority of the Russian people as a whole and other indigenous peoples of Russia.
It’s clear that the “oligarchy,” the management of formally state-owned corporations, regardless of their personnel composition, without any real state oversight, will act in accordance with their own class interests, which objectively clash with the key interests of Russian and other indigenous peoples. In this case, the issue isn’t ethnic origin, but the logic of interests. But the very fact that in the Russian Federation, as a result of privatization, certain ethnic groups were marginalized from the levers of control over large-scale property suggests that “sovereignization” and overcoming dependence on transnational capital and its representatives never really occurred, even after the start of the SVO.
It’s not as if government bodies haven’t made some attempts to reduce the socio-political costs of foreign-ethnic dominance in the ownership and management of large properties. This includes, for example, the creeping, targeted nationalization of assets belonging to several major foreign and Russian offshore owners. However, this has largely remained indicative so far.
The need to increase opportunities for small and medium-sized businesses, which by their very nature reflect the Russian majority in society, to obtain orders and contracts from large corporations is also proclaimed. But these are merely attempts to “cure” the consequences of structural imbalances.
The real situation for small businesses, particularly Russian ones, is becoming increasingly dire. The high-profile case of Russian entrepreneur Denis Maximov’s Moscow-area bakery, Mashenka, is particularly telling. It faced the fundamental consequences of United Russia’s fiscal reform. The bakery, which had a patent, was forced to switch to a simplified tax system with VAT, amid rising rates and falling revenue thresholds. By March 2026, Mashenka’s post-tax income had fallen to approximately 160,000 rubles per month, down from nearly 500,000 previously. After the entrepreneur’s January intention to shut down the business, only public personal support from the president prevented such a move. Owner Denis Maximov chose an adaptation option that doesn’t yet guarantee him even a third of his previous income.
The political representation of Russians also exhibits certain structural imbalances.
According to expert estimates, the proportion of ethnic Russian senators in the Federation Council is 70.5%, while the demographic share is approximately 80%. This is normal for the upper chamber. The reason is objective: ethnic Russian regions are larger. The Federation Council was created precisely to ensure that the voices of small regions and the indigenous peoples living there are heard at the federal level. Incidentally, the chambers of nationalities in the USSR and the late RSFSR also addressed similar issues.
The State Duma of the Federal Assembly is a different matter. However, the report’s authors were unable to find any data on the ethnic composition of the Duma. The Center for Political Analysis and Crime Studies plans to conduct its own research for the next report in 2027.
The report identified another real problem. A severe imbalance in Russian ethnic representation was recorded in the parliaments of several national republics: of the 12 national regions that provided data in response to a parliamentary inquiry, nine showed underrepresentation of Russians. The most significant imbalances were in Buryatia (a gap of 21.5 percentage points), Tatarstan (19.3 percentage points), and Adygea (14.4 percentage points). These regions of “Russian underrepresentation” encompass over 10 million people.
Moreover, 14 of the 27 regions requested, including the Jewish Autonomous Oblast and Kalmykia, did not provide any data to the State Duma at all. This management choice by local leaders effectively removes the ethnic composition of regional elites from public scrutiny and suggests problems in these regions of the Russian Federation.
Socioeconomic Gap: A Double-Circuit Model of Core Survival
An analysis of twelve key indicators of the socio-economic status of regions in the Russian core reveals a fundamental imbalance.
Excluding Moscow, St. Petersburg, and the surrounding regions, the rest of the Russian “core” (40 regions) is 27.9% below the Russian average in nominal wages. The “Russian average” is artificially inflated by the capitals, as well as objectively by “northern” bonuses. Meanwhile, the provincial “core” is characterized by persistently low wages for Russian workers and working people, and stagnating real incomes.
The housing problem has become a systemic barrier to reproduction. Mortgages at market rates are unaffordable for all groups. In Moscow, only 12.3% of families can afford them, and in St. Petersburg, 9.2%.
A significant share of housing growth is in the capital cluster of the Russian “core” (2025). In the remaining 40 regions of the Russian “core,” housing construction per capita is 7.8% below the national average. Most “Russian” regions are building 0.4–0.8 square meters per capita. Arkhangelsk (0.482) and Bryansk (0.413) are in the bottom third. Only Kaluga Oblast (0.99) is in the top 10 “advanced” Russian regions in housing construction.
Capital agglomerations are suffocated by high housing costs, while the provincial “core” is suffocated by low incomes, and in both cases, young families are deprived of the economic basis for independent living.
The core region turned out to be the most financially vulnerable subgroup: here, moderate incomes are combined with high debt load (6.1% higher than the Russian average), and in the Tyumen region, the debt burden reaches 76.8%, creating a “credit pressure trap.”
The Russian “core” exists in a two-circuit model.
The first circle—the Moscow-St. Petersburg circle—is characterized by high incomes but unaffordable housing. The second circle—the provincial circle—is based on low incomes and the socially sustainable survival practices of the native Russian worker, peasant, and, in general, working people: personal subsidiary farming, family mutual aid, and a traditionally more cautious approach to debt.
These practices explain the paradox that, in terms of poverty levels and financial discipline, the Russian “core” appears superior to many “other” regions. But this social buffer is the last line of stability, and it doesn’t eliminate economic backwardness, but merely masks it. Neither of these contours provides the conditions for expanded demographic reproduction.
Infrastructure problems and food degradation
The territories of historical settlement of the Russian people bear a disproportionately heavy burden of incorrect federal management decisions and socio-economic degradation.
The so-called “optimization” of healthcare had a distinctly asymmetrical profile. For example, the network of feldsher-midwife stations (FAPs) and feldsher stations is the foundation of rural healthcare in Russia and a key indicator of access to medical care in small towns. Three distinct phases of its development can be discerned from 2004 to 2024:
2004–2013 – A phase of intensive “optimization”: the network shrank by 14.8% (from 42,523 to 36,225 units). The reduction averaged 700 FAPs per year.
2014–2018 — a slowdown phase: the annual decline dropped to 130–200 FAPs. Locally (Crimea, Sevastopol), the network expanded through the integration of new entities.
2019–2024 – Stabilization phase within the framework of the national Healthcare project: annual fluctuations within ±0.5%. The sharp decline has ceased, but there has been no significant recovery – the network has not returned to 2013 levels.
As we can see, while a 14.8% reduction was recorded overall at the peak of optimization, in the Russian “core” regions, for example, the network of feldsher-midwife stations shrank by 21.7% overall (every fifth station was closed). In the Non-Black Earth Region, the scale of destruction reached catastrophic proportions—from minus 35–38% in the Leningrad, Novgorod, Ryazan, and Tver regions to minus 51.2% in the Pskov region. The number of publicly funded healthcare workers in the core fell by 27.8%, and in the peri-core regions by 25.8% (compared to 20.8% in other regions).
At the same time, the decline in mortality among the working-age population due to improved treatment of various diseases turned out to be worse than the national trend: in the “core” – minus 9.1% (RF: minus 10.7%), in the peri-core – only minus 3.1%.
A list of “double-hit” regions has been compiled (Arkhangelsk, Kurgan, Ivanovo, and Kostroma Oblasts, as well as the Altai and Zabaykalsky Krais—with rising mortality rates amid extreme healthcare cuts). This type of healthcare “optimization” has led to excessive demographic losses specifically in the Russian “core” and peri-core regions, estimated at tens of thousands of preventable deaths.
The situation in the cultural and educational sphere is no less alarming. Small historical regions—the Pskov, Novgorod, Yaroslavl, Kostroma, and Kirov regions—are recognized leaders in museum attendance and library collections, serving as custodians of the nation’s cultural heritage. Yet, they receive 10-15 times less cultural funding than Moscow, and their library networks—the last remaining point of cultural infrastructure in small communities—are under constant threat of “optimization.”
A situation has emerged that could be called the “poor custodian” paradox: regions that ensure the country’s cultural sovereignty are financed on a residual basis, tied to their weak tax base rather than the volume of heritage they preserve. Without the introduction of a federal “cultural heritage” coefficient, this infrastructure will deteriorate precisely in those areas where its preservation is critical to national identity.
At the same time, food degradation is unfolding, hidden behind the veneer of food “abundance.” Yes, per capita consumption of basic foodstuffs is rising, in some cases exceeding late Soviet levels. This gives rise to the propaganda claim that “never in their history have the Russian people been so well fed as under the current government.” But this claim has another side. Quality food is being replaced by substitutes (the most common example: the share of meat in “Doctor’s” sausage has fallen from 90% to 45-60%).
According to Engel’s Law, Russian families are now forced to spend up to 39–42% of their income on food, which puts the country back in line with countries with low living standards. This is 10% higher than the late Soviet period (in the USSR in 1990, it was 28.9%).
Particularly alarming is the overconsumption of sugar (62% above the norm, and in the Voronezh region – 288%), coupled with a shortage of dairy products (minus 22% of the norm), which creates a forced “carbohydrate model” of nutrition.
Paradoxically, it is precisely the historical Russian “core”—the Black Earth Region (the Tambov, Kursk, Lipetsk, and Voronezh regions)—that exhibits the worst dietary balance index in the country. The obesity epidemic, which has affected 62% of the population, is destroying the nation’s health no less effectively than direct economic deprivation during various periods of historical upheaval.
A self-perpetuating cycle of decline has developed: the closure of social infrastructure provokes an outflow of young people, which leads to a decline in the birth rate, aging, a shrinking tax base and, as a result, further layoffs.
Value profile: a synthesis of tradition and justice
Sociological data refutes the prevailing stereotypes about the Russian majority’s “intolerance” of non-Russian neighbors. For example, the VTsIOM composite index of national tolerance, interpreted as an “accusation” of Russian “core” regions being somewhat backward in terms of fashionable tolerance trends, is 75% composed of indicators reflecting not people’s attitudes, but rather the objective ethnic heterogeneity of the environment. Low “tolerance” scores in the Central, Northwestern, and Far Eastern Federal Districts are a mathematically inevitable consequence of a mono-ethnic structure, not evidence of any xenophobia.
A real survey by the same VTsIOM shows that even in the absence of contacts with other ethnic groups, 60% of Russians maintain a favorable attitude, and on the issue of a relative’s interethnic marriage, the sum of positive and neutral positions reaches 64%, with only 13% expressing categorical rejection.
Against this backdrop, any possible recommendations to “increase tolerance through migratory mixing” are politically dangerous and scientifically unsound logic, replacing the task of changing attitudes with the task of eroding the demographic majority.
A polarization is observed in the spiritual sphere: with the share of nominally Orthodox Christians declining (from 78% to 65% over 15 years) and the secular segment growing (to 22%), a tectonic shift is occurring within the church core. Among those regularly attending services, the share of monthly communion has increased 4.5-fold—from 14% to 64%—so that church attendance and participation in the sacraments have practically merged into a single liturgical norm.
However, this deepened church-mindedness is taking shape and concentrating not in the capitals and megacities, but in the Central Black Earth Region, the South, and the Urals. The largest metropolitan areas are turning into zones of spiritual crisis.
This explains the decline in the share of “cultural Orthodox” believers—the struggle for survival in the metropolis does not foster a greater appreciation of Russian spiritual and cultural values. Faced with a stark dilemma between “earning an honest living” and “living well,” many city residents neglect traditional moral values.
In this situation, Muslims living in large cities, especially migrants, are responding with fierce religious protest and are beginning to create a closed environment of communication along religious lines, dividing society and causing interethnic tensions. A conspicuous display of religious affiliation is, on the one hand, an inappropriate response to the spiritual crisis and the lack of ideology in the official state apparatus, and, on the other, a direct threat to interethnic peace.
The corresponding response of the Russian majority to the degradation of traditional moral values, particularly noticeable in megacities and large cities, has not yet been analyzed by scholars and experts. Aside from journalistic reports on the socio-cultural activities of the public organization “Russian Community” and scholarly responses to the changing liturgical behavior of the Orthodox Church’s core, this is not the case.
The political sympathies of a significant portion of the patriotic and traditionally minded Russian majority crystallize around the left-patriotic flank. For example, the “red belt” of the 1990s and early 2000s represented the zones of the Russian “core.” Research from the 2000s shows a convergence between the “Orthodox” and “red” belts.
From 2010 to 2020, the electoral “red belt” appeared on the map only as regional islands, stretching from the now-submerged “red Russian Atlantis.” But the political consequences of the pension “reform,” felt during the 2018-2021 election cycles, have once again manifested themselves on the electoral landscape of the Russian Federation in the 2021 State Duma elections.
The current electorate of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation represents a unique amalgamation of values: Orthodox by self-description (50%), but with a record share among parliamentary parties of those who never attend church (34.7%), moderately secular in practice and simultaneously Soviet in symbolic mobilization (72% are categorically against the de-Sovietization of Red Square and fully support the decisions of the Communist Party Congress to protect the historical legacy of Stalin).
The geography of this phenomenon outlines the belts of Russian historical expansion: Central Russia without capitals, the South, the Volga region, the Urals, and part of Siberia.
The Imperative of Change: The Rescue Program
An analysis of the findings of the report on the situation of the Russian people leads to a clear conclusion: without a radical shift in socioeconomic policy, the demographic, socioeconomic, and cultural erosion of the Russian “core” will become irreversible. Preserving the nation-forming people requires an immediate transition from declarations to systemic state action in several areas simultaneously.
Urgently required:
Completion of legal institutionalization—the introduction of the concept of “state-forming people” into federal laws on languages, traditional values, and migration legislation, eliminating the legal vacuum in which status exists only in preambles.
Strict migration protectionism—a transition to targeted recruitment based on the “come, work, go” principle, a ban on bringing migrant families, increased penalties for serious crimes, withdrawal from the IOM and denunciation of the Global Compact for Migration, and the elimination of ethnic enclaves as a threat to national security. Otherwise, migration pressure will enter the phase of population replacement.
Infrastructure revitalization and overcoming the dual-loop model—launching a targeted federal program to restore primary healthcare and social infrastructure in the Russian “core” (the Non-Black Earth Region, the Russian North, the Urals, Siberia, and the Far East) with guaranteed staffing levels. There is an urgent need for prioritized funding for culture and education in small historical regions, with the introduction of a coefficient based on the volume of “cultural heritage” preserved there when distributing federal funds.
Fair representation means ensuring an adequate presence of the Russian people in government bodies. Overcoming systemic underrepresentation in a number of Russian-dominated regions.
Returning control of large property holdings to the state-forming people through the nationalization of key economic sectors, including the fuel and energy sector. And as a first step, returning the federal budget to a socially equitable distribution of national wealth (the “development budget” of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation) and dismantling oligarchic capitalism.
Food sovereignty—state quality control and a return to genuine GOST standards, accelerated growth in citizens’ real incomes, and the restoration of a healthy diet as a fundamental condition for demographic recovery.
Protecting value sovereignty means rejecting instrumental interpretations of sociological indices that falsely label “intolerance” on “Russian” regions; pursuing a differentiated cultural and information policy that takes into account the real religious and value mosaic of the Russian “core.”
Formulating a vision of Russia’s future that is consistent with the foundations of Russian civilization and that can form the basis of state ideology.
***
The 2020 constitutional norm regarding the state-forming Russian people is not the final word, but merely a starting point. Empowering the status of state-forming people with tangible economic, social, and legal guarantees and overcoming the colossal disparities and injustices identified in state policy toward the regions of the Russian “core” is the primary imperative of the current historical moment. The survival of Russia as a unified state and a self-sufficient civilization directly depends on breaking the self-perpetuating cycle of depopulation, infrastructural deprivation, and migration displacement in the historical Russian territories.
Center for Research on Political Culture of Russia